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THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF AN INSURED 
IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE 
RESOLVED BY AN APPELLATE COURT ON REVIEW OF 
THE GRANT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I'M- ' >s„-- presented on 
appeal and failed to apply the proper D I ^ I ^ L ^ iev.e, ^ 
connection wren trie trial court's granting jf a irotion :" -
summary judgment. The court below ruled, as a matter of law, 
that the express words of the insurance policy in question had 
to control the interpretation of the parties* agreement. This 
Court, .however, held that contract terms which are "against the 
reasonable expectations of the parties may be found void in the 
appropriate circumstances." Slip. Op. at 5. This Court 
further acknowledged that to determine the reasonable 
expectations of the insured one must examine "extrinsic matters 
such as the intent of the parties, the purpose sought to be 
accomplished, the subject matter of the contract, and 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy." Slip. 
Op. at 6. 
It has been uniformly acknowledged that where 
interpretation of a written instrument turns 
on the acceptance of extrinsic evidence, the 
process of weighing such evidence should be 
for the trier of fact. 
Hausam v. Wodrich, 574 P.2d 805, 809 (Alas. 1978). As noted in 
the Restatement of Contracts 2d, § 212 comment e (1981), "if 
the issue depends on evidence outside the writing, and the 
possible inferences are conflicting, the choice is for the 
trier of fact." 
In the instant case, Mr. Wagner purchased 
"underinsurance" coverage, not just uninsured motorist coverage, 
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which he was told could be used as a "supplement to [an 
underinsured's] bodily injury insurance. . . . " Depo. of 
Cal Coleman at p. 15. Mrs. Wagner has alleged that she and her 
husband had a reasonable expectation that such coverage would 
protect them if one of them was injured by the negligence of an 
underinsured driver. The defendant moved for summary judgment 
on the grounds that Utah didn't recognize the reasonable 
expectations doctrine and the trial court agreed. It is 
inappropriate for this Court to acknowledge, on the one hand, 
that Utah does recognize the doctrine, and then on the other to 
affirm the Court as though it had made a factual ruling on that 
issue, which it did not. 
Where a trial court has based its ruling on 
a misunderstanding of the law, or might have 
done so, and a correct application would 
have produced a different result, the party 
adversely affected is entitled to have the 
matter readjudicated under correct principle 
of law. 
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 420-21 
(Utah 1983) . 
It is important to remember that this case was decided 
while in its infancy. Only one deposition was taken before 
defendant sought judgment on the sole basis that under the 
terms of the policy "uninsured motorist coverage is excluded by 
the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle which does not 
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include an automobile owned by or furnished or available for 
the regular use of an insured or any family member." 
Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment at p. 1. This 
Court, having found that the reasonable expectations of the 
insured can operate to preclude enforcement of the express 
terms of the policy and that extrinsic evidence is required to 
resolve this question, should not preclude the development and 
presentation of such extrinsic evidence to the factfinder by 
affirming a grant of summary judgment on a ground which was not 
argued to the trial court. To do so would be to deny the 
plaintiff the right to present her evidence on an issue of fact 
which has not heretofore been decided by the trier of fact and 
to substitute the judgment of this Court for that of the trier 
of fact on a factual issue. 
The Court treated this appeal as though the case had 
been fully resolved on the basis of stipulated facts. This is 
not correct. While the parties did not dispute the evidence in 
the record, a material dispute certainly existed regarding the 
ultimate fact, Mr. Wagner's reasonable expectations. The 
defendant offered no evidence on this question, it merely 
asserted that it was immaterial because the express language of 
the contract was controlling as a matter of law. Having 
determined that Mr. Wagner's reasonable expectations are 
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material to the resolution of this case, this Court should 
remand to the District Court for presentation of evidence on 
this question to the factfinder. 
In moving for summary judgment, the defendant did not 
assert that there was no dispute concerning Mr. Wagner's 
reasonable expectations and did not purport to even base its 
motion on the deposition testimony of Mr. Coleman. See 
Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment at p. 2. This 
testimony was presented to the lower court in support of 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. While this Court is 
clearly of the opinion that plaintiffs motion was properly 
denied, that should not equate to a holding that defendant's 
motion was properly granted. The unresolved issue of fact, 
which had not been developed or ruled upon in the court below, 
was whether Mr. Wagner had a reasonable expectation of coverage 
under the circumstances of the case. 
The Court's error in reviewing this matter was its 
examination of the record to determine if plaintiff had proven 
her case as of the date of the defendant's motion was heard. 
The plaintiff has no such burden in opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, and certainly not when the motion was 
predicated on an issue of lawe 
While the Court indicated that it has made a "thorough 
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review of the record" and found the plaintiff's evidence 
wanting in establishing her case, it must be remembered that 
this is not the Court's function in reviewing the grant of a 
motion for summary judgment. It is axiomatic that in reviewing 
the grant of a motion for summary judgment all doubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be 
construed in the light most favorable to the party resisting 
the motion. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). It is the moving 
party's burden to marshal all the evidence and he is only 
entitled to judgment "where [he] makes a showing which 
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to 
the losing party,," FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 
594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1979). Here, the moving party offered no 
evidence of Mr. Wagner's expectation or its reasonableness, nor 
did the court below make any factual finding on the question. 
The court below ruled that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectation was not the law in Utah. This Court disagreed, but 
failed to recognize that the trial court had not addressed the 
fact issue, which it deemed to be immaterial. The effect of 
this Court's ruling, upon grounds differing from those advanced 
in the trial court, is to preclude plaintiff from the 
opportunity of developing or presenting her evidence to the 
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factfinder for determination. As our Supreme Court stated in 
Reliable Furniture Co, v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins, Underwriters, 
Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), 
It is . . .to safeguard the right of access 
to the courts for the enforcement of rights 
and the remedy of wrongs by a trial, and by 
a jury if desired, that it is of such 
importance that the court should take care 
to see that the party adversely affected has 
a fair opportunity to present his 
contentions against precipitate action which 
will deprive him of that privilege. His 
contentions as to facts should be considered 
in the light most favorable to him, and only 
if it clearly appears that he could not 
establish a right to recovery under the law 
should such action [entry of summary 
judgment] be taken; and any doubts which 
exist should be resolved in favor of 
affording him the privilege of a trial. 
398 Utah 2d 685. 
As noted by Justice Durham in State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Utah 1987) 
(Durham, J., dissenting), if the issue of an insured's 
reasonable expectations is squarely put before the trial court, 
judgment for the insurer cannot be sustained unless that issue 
has been the subject of factual findings by the court. 
Such findings have not been made in this case. This 
Court incorrectly treated this action as though the plaintiff 
was appealing from an adverse ruling on the basis of stipulated 
facts. This is incorrect. The basic fact about which the 
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parties have not agree'd, and upon which plaintiff has not 
received a determination by the trier of fact, is Mr. Wagner's 
reasonable expectation of coverage. This Court should not 
substitute its judgment on this question for that of the 
factfinder on the basis of evidence contained in a truncated 
record. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasonable expectations of an insured presents a 
factual issue which must be presented to the factfinder for 
resolution on the basis of extrinsic evidence and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. This has never occurred in 
this action. Plaintiff is entitled to develop her evidence and 
present it to the trial court even if this Court is of the 
opinion that it would resolve that question against her on the 
basis of what it presently knows of the evidence. Weighing the 
evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence is not a 
function of an appellate court. This is the province of the 
trial court and it has yet to occur in this case. Accordingly, 
the matter should be remanded for resolution of the factual 
issue presented on the basis of the standards outlined in the 
Court's prior opinion. 
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